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INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAWAND ITS OTHERS: GOVERNANCE BY NORM VERSUS
GOVERNANCE BY KNOWLEDGE
Liam McHugh-Russell*
Domestic laws are shaped by myriad global governance projects, which may attract the support of different
organizations, promote contrasting socioeconomic visions, and operate at diverse levels and scales.1 Beyond dif-
ferences in their whos, whats, and wheres, governance projects are also differentiated by their hows: they may
embody different ways of imagining relations between order, authority, and legitimacy;2 operate through different
styles;3 or deploy different technologies.4 International legal regimes, which function through a logic of governance
that applies norms sanctioned by the political consent of states, have long operated alongside “systems of man-
agement and control” drawing their legitimacy from claims of “objective, disinterested scientific knowledge.”5
This essay explores how such “governance by knowledge”6 interacts with international law’s “governance by
norm,”7 through a case study of theWorld Bank’sDoing Business project and the International LabourOrganization
(ILO)’s responses to it. I contend that Doing Business ultimately rests on “bad science,”8 and thus offers a potent
illustration of the power wielded by actors who claim “technical” knowledge. I argue that those who fail to engage
with the technicalities of the knowledge claims that ground projects likeDoing Business, and who instead meet such
projects primarily through the idiom of (international) legal normativity, may have already lost the battle for
influence.
The Doing Business Project
Though Doing Business is usually identified with its annual reports, the project’s core activity is the annual pro-
duction of eleven business regulation indicators for 190 countries. The indicators pose a “snapshot” of regulation
on themes ranging from the straightforward, such as access to electricity, to the highly contentious, such as
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employing workers.9 The indicators are based in part on whether national law guarantees specified rights to certain
actors and in part on the estimated time, cost, and number of steps involved for a business to conduct a given legal
or administrative task.
The project’s hallmark is its ranking of countries by a weighted aggregate of these indicators. Updated rankings and
scores are disseminated through annual reports, which also describe current methodologies, explore thematic case
studies, and elaborate on project rationales. The reports make the tacit message of the rankings explicit: reallocate
legal rights and reform legal practices to push each indicator score as high (or in some cases as low) as possible.
The project’s influence has been remarkable.10 National political leaders, including heavyweights in Russia,
India, and the United Kingdom, have made the Doing Business rankings a key benchmark for reforms.11 More
than fifty states have government units mandated to respond to the project.12 Their efforts have had striking
results.13 Georgia climbed the ranking from one hundred to eleven between 2004 and 2011.14 Between 2016
and 2018, China moved from seventy-eight to forty-six, while India jumped up an astonishing fifty-three spots,
to fifty-seven.15
Qualitative studies tracing national reform processes16 have given the lie to perennial concerns that responses to
Doing Business are no more than paper-pushing and hot air.17 Sam Schueth, for example, has closely traced how
Doing Business drove mid-2000s reforms in Georgia that reshaped not only corporate law and property, customs,
and tax administration, but also labor law.18
Governance by Norm and Governance by Knowledge
How does the governance logic of the Doing Business project differ from that of international labor law? Doing
Business is framed as prescriptive rather than embodying a “normative” obligation with moral or legal force.19 It
purports to offer a technical means to an end desired by a unitary, domestic policy actor, not a norm of conduct
9 Amanda Perry-Kessaris, The Re-Co-Construction of Legitimacy of/Through the Doing Business Indicators, 13 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 498, 500–02
(2017).
10 Rush Doshi et al., The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing Business Indicator and Global Regulatory Behavior, 73 INT’L ORG. 611, 617 (2019).
11 Id. at 620–21.
12 Id. at 622.
13 Id. at 621–27.
14 Sam Schueth,Winning the Rankings Game: The Republic of Georgia, USAID, and the Doing Business Project, in RANKING THE WORLD 151, 183
(Alexander Cooley & Jack L. Snyder eds., 2015).
15 How the Big Emerging Economies Climbed the World Bank Business Ranking, ECONOMIST (Nov. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Climbing the Ranking];
WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2017: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL (2016); WORLD BANK, TRAINING FOR REFORM: DOING BUSINESS 2019
(2018).
16 See, e.g., Doshi et al., supra note 10, at 633–39; Michal Lyons et al.,DoMicro Enterprises Benefit from the “Doing Business”Reforms? The Case of
Street-Vending in Tanzania, 51 URB. STUD. 1593, 1597 (2014); Benito Arruñada,HowDoing Business Jeopardises Institutional Reform, 10 EUR. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 555, 562 (2009); Chang-Hsien Tsai, Regulatory Competition and the World Bank’s Doing Business Reports: Taiwan’s Liberalization of the
Minimum Capital Requirement for Incorporation as an Example, 13 NAT’L TAIWAN U.L. REV. 239 (2018); Trang Nguyen, Note, Grading Regulators:
The Impact of Global and Local Indicators on Vietnam’s Business Governance, 88 N.Y.U.L. REV. 2254 (2013); Lin Lin & Michael Ewing-Chow, The
Doing Business Index on Minority Investor Protection: The Case of Singapore, 2016 SINGAPORE J.L. STUD. 46 (2016).
17 Mary Hallward-Driemeier & Lant Pritchett, How Business Is Done in the Developing World: Deals Versus Rules, 29 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 121
(2015); Climbing the Ranking, supra note 15.
18 Schueth, supra note 14, at 167–71.
19 Yaraslau Kryvoi, The World Bank and the ILO: Two Visions of Employment Regulation, in FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 47, 48
(Roger Blanpain & Claire Grant eds., 2009).
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that balances various social and economic interests.20 Its authority is grounded in the epistemic validity of (quasi)
objective data and statistical science, not the legitimacy afforded by an appropriate political process.21 As stated in a
high-level review that the Bank commissioned in 2008, the project is “anchored in research that links character-
istics of a country’s business environment… tomacroeconomic outcomes.”22 Specifically, the project drawsmuch
of its authority from empirical data correlating indicator values with economic benefits, and on (ultimately flawed)
statistical methods that exploit differences in national “legal origins” to characterize those correlations as causal.23
The most palpable contrast between Doing Business and international labor law lies in their divergent socioeco-
nomic agendas. The Doing Business approach to labor markets is consonant with a broader “flexibility” agenda
aggressively pursued by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development.24 In line with this understanding of flexibility,25 the project’s
Employing Workers indicator embodies a deregulatory approach to labor markets that, in practice, shifts signifi-
cant power over working conditions to employers.26 In its early years, the indicator was used by the Bank as a
template for numerous Bank-sponsored national labor law reforms.27
The labor dimensions of Doing Business met substantial challenges, on multiple fronts.28 The project’s entangle-
ments with the broader flexibility agenda make it hard to isolate political responses to the former from broader
resistance to the latter.29 Nonetheless, a number of actors expressly targeted the labor dimensions ofDoing Business,
including, notably, the ILO itself.30
While ILO interventions deployed numerous critiques, its approach can be characterized as a synthesis of two
stratagems. The scientific stratagem critiqued various “methodological and conceptual problems” with the
Employing Workers indicator and its subcomponents.31 Those critiques suggested that the indicator did not
20 As shown in the examples of both Georgia and Sénégal, the implied addressees ofDoing Businessmay be particularly amenable to “low
visibility strategies,” even at the highest levels. Adelle Blackett, Beyond Standard Setting: A Study of ILO Technical Cooperation on Regional Labor
Law Reform in West and Central Africa, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 443, 474–75 (2011).
21 Cf. FRANCIS MAUPAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOURORGANIZATION IN THEGLOBAL ECONOMY 7 (2013) (ILO’s authority
grounded in tripartite debate).
22 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, DOING BUSINESS: AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION—TAKING THE MEASURE OF THE WORLD BANK-
IFC DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS xv (2008).
23 Liam McHugh-Russell, Doing Business, Legal Origins Theory, and the Politics of “Governance by Knowledge”, CAN. J. DEV. STUD. (under
review).
24 Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and Economic Development, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 43 (2009); Blackett, supra note 20, at 464–66;
Kerry Rittich, Core Labor Rights and Labor Market Flexibility: Two Paths Entwined?, in LABOR LAW BEYOND BORDERS (Permanent Court of
Arbitration ed., 2003).
25 Cf. Santos, supra note 24, at 74–80.
26 Id. at 60; Rittich, supra note 24, at 174–75.
27 Kryvoi, supra note 19, at 48; Peter Bakvis, The World Bank’s Doing Business Report: A Last Fling for the Washington Consensus?, 15 TRANSFER
419, 425 (2009).
28 See generally Bakvis, supra note 27.
29 See, e.g., the Nepalese case discussed id. at 428–29.
30 Int’l Labour Office,World BankDoing Business Report: The Employing Workers Indicator, ILOGoverning Body, 300th Session, GB.300/
4/1 (2007). The ILO’s approach had tacit assent from the tripartite membership. See Minutes of the 300th Session of the Governing Body of the
International Labour Office, No. GB.300/PV paras. 109–32 (2007).
31 Int’l Labour Office, supra note 30, paras. 10(b), 28 (“methodological and technical problems”). The stratagem echoed, and partially
relied on, research advancing similar claims. See Sangheon Lee & Deirdre McCann, Measuring Labour Market Institutions: Conceptual and
Methodological Questions on “Working Hours Rigidity”, in IN DEFENCE OF LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 32 (Janine Berg & David Kucera
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adequately reckon with interactions between different labor market rules, appreciate the importance of law in
action, or account for the social and economic benefits of labor market institutions alongside their economic costs.
The legal stratagem turned on claims that the reforms promoted by Doing Business conflicted with the spirit of
international labor law, and the letter of certain ILO Conventions.32 The legal stratagem combined that critique
with an appeal to international legal functionalism and interorganizational comity; the watchword was “policy
coherence.”33 Francis Maupain’s reading is paradigmatic. Invoking the concept of international legal fragmenta-
tion,34 Maupain characterizes incompatibilities between ILO activities and those of international financial institu-
tions as a matter of reconciling conflicting organizational mandates.35 His analysis interprets the World Bank’s
charter as a constitutional text and its approach to labor markets as doctrine.36 His reading of Doing Business is
thus framed as a case study in the legal subordination of the ILO’s social objectives to the Bank’s economic
functions.37
These two stratagems had a number of shortcomings. The issues raised by the scientific stratagem, though
crucial for theorizing labor institutions, had little critical purchase on Doing Business methods. The Doing Business
indicators are not based on “assumptions” about the effect of regulations,38 but on causal claims tied to statistical
analysis of empirical data. Balancing economic and social ends is incompatible with amethodology concerned with
tying particular actions to particular effects, which is likely why the invocation of international labor law standards
and their purposes seems so misplaced in the research that grounded the scientific stratagem.39
The legal stratagem, by contrast, did not fully appreciate the strategic context. There is a patent “functional inco-
herence” between the Employing Workers indicator and international labor law. Yet it is hard to pinpoint why this
tension should matter to proponents ofDoing Business. Unlike the application of trade agreements by a WTO dispute
panel, the methodology, scores, and rankings deployed by Doing Business are not an exercise in legal interpretation.40
The “doctrine” the project promotes is not legally derivable from theWorld Bank’s mandate. In fact, it is only loosely
tied to the Bank’s legally-granted powers.41 Stated differently, the project does not express a norm that might notion-
ally be integrated into the broader international legal field, but a technical claim about how to achieve an end.42
eds., 2008); Sangheon Lee et al., The World Bank’s “Employing Workers” Index: Findings and Critiques –AReview of Recent Evidence, 147 INT’L LAB.
REV. 416 (2008); Janine Berg & Sandrine Cazes, Policymaking Gone Awry: The Labor Market Regulations of the Doing Business Indicators, 29 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 349 (2008). See also Santos, supra note 24, at 65–68; Paul Benjamin et al., The Cost of “Doing Business” and Labour Regulation:
The Case of South Africa, 149 INT’L LAB. REV. 73 (2010).
32 Int’l Labour Office, supra note 30, paras. 10(e), 20–27; Kryvoi, supra note 19, at 51–53.
33 Int’l Labour Office, supra note 30, paras. 1, 4, 9,10(e)-(f).
34 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
35 MAUPAIN, supra note 21, at 63–65, 67, 71–72.
36 Id. at 72–83.
37 Id. at 79–80.
38 Contra Berg & Cazes, supra note 31, at 364–66; Lee et al., supra note 31, at 424–26; Lee &McCann, supra note 31, at 32, 39, 46–47, 58–
59.
39 See, e.g., Berg & Cazes, supra note 31, at 350, 353–55; Lee et al., supra note 31, at 421; Claude Ménard & Bertrand du Marais, Can We
Rank Legal Systems According to Their Economic Efficiency?, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 74–75 (2008).
40 Contra MAUPAIN, supra note 21, at 63–64.
41 Id. at 73–76. Maupain’s point, tied to the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment, apply
equally to the Articles of the International Finance Corporation.
42 But see Int’l Labour Office, supra note 30, at 29–31 (tying critiques to World Bank activities that require national responses to Doing
Business metrics).
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The outcome of the ILO’s intervention appears to be a good-news story for international “functional coherence.” In
2010, theWorld Bank quarantined the EmployingWorkers indicator from other parts of the report, and prohibited its
use in other Bank activities.43 Although funding provisos by the U.S. Congress were the proximate cause of these
changes,44 a broader view suggests that the shift resulted from an amalgam of international norms and local activism.45
Closer scrutiny reveals unintended, even perverse effects. The formal neutralization of the Employing Workers
indicator may have further reduced the visibility of World Bank strategies driving the flexibility agenda.46
Moreover, ILO interventions were silent on the most salient fact about Doing Business methodology: the funda-
mental weaknesses in the modes of causal inference that support its policy guidance.47 Worse, those interventions
were expressed in diplomatic prose that signaled the ILO’s approval of the project’s overall design and aims.48 As a
result, the ILO may have ultimately bolstered the project’s legitimacy by chasing small changes to what gets mea-
sured, rather than fundamentally challenging how the project uses those measurements. Likewise, the ILO’s
appeals to international legal coherence may have given an air of legal authority to models and standards that
are in fact grounded in little more than mechanical objectivity and a rote showing of technical rigor.49 No binding
norm regulates the relative priority of the international system’s social and economic goals. This sometimes pro-
duces policy incoherence. But reading every conflict between international institutions as a problem of normative
ordering risks lending legal legitimacy to bad science.50
Conclusion
Global governance projects depend on different permutations of knowledge, power, and action. Such differ-
ences are the key theme of recent scholarship on governance by indicators,51 of which Doing Business is an arche-
type.52 Governance competitors to international law, however, are not limited to projects that rely on the ostensible
objectivity of numbers. For example, much of the technical cooperation conducted under the banner of develop-
ment during the last seventy-five years, including by the ILO,53 has drawn its power more from the epistemic
authority of experts than the political legitimacy of its origins. It may be more useful to think in terms of this essay’s
distinction between governance by norm and governance by knowledge.
The power ofDoing Business is of continuing concern for those willing to invoke “the spirit of international labor
law.” For example, the project continues to promote reforms on business registration and property administration
that exacerbate the exclusion of informal workers.54 For those concerned with the traditional subjects of interna-
tional labor law, and those who for too long were its “others,” there is value in attending carefully to the “hows.”
43 Independent Doing Business Report Review Panel, Independent Panel Review of the Doing Business Report 24-25 (June 2013).
44 John Ohnesorge, Legal Origins and the Tasks of Corporate Law in Economic Development: A Preliminary Exploration, B.Y.U.L. REV. 1619,
1626–27 (2009).
45 Cf. Julia López López, Anti-Austerity Activism Strategies: Combining Protest and Litigation in Spain, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
TRANSNATIONAL LABOUR LAW (Adelle Blackett & Anne Trebilcock eds., 2015).
46 See supra, text at notes 4–26.
47 McHugh-Russell, supra note 23.
48 Int’l Labour Office, supra note 30, paras. 5, 8, 32.
49 Cf. Van Den Meerssche, supra note 7, at 172–75.
50 See supra note 8.
51 E.g., Davis et al., supra note 4.
52 Kevin E. Davis &Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of theDoing Business Project, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1095 (2007).
53 GUY FITI SINCLAIR, TO REFORM THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN STATES 30–31 (2017).
54 Arruñada, supra note 16; Lyons et al., supra note 16.
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